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Introduction:  Changing  health  care  systems  and  market  competition  requires  hospital
boards  to shift  their  focus  towards  a systematic  governance  of  the  quality  of  care.  The
objective  of  our  study  was  to  describe  hospital  governance  and  the  quality  orientation  in
the Netherlands.  Also  we  wished  to  investigate  the  relationship  with  hospital  performance.
Materials  and methods:  The  chairs  of both  the  boards  of trustees  and  the management  boards
from  all  97  Dutch  hospitals  were  asked  to  participate  in a cross-sectional  study  between
November  2010  and  February  2011.  In this  period  data  on  their  quality  orientation  were
collected  using  a  web-based  survey.  Data  on hospital  performance  over  the  year  2010  were
obtained  in  July  2011.
Results:  A  mixture  of  reforms  and  national  guidelines  increased  the  emphasis  on  quality
governance  in  Dutch  hospitals.  Our  results  show  that  boards  of trustees  and  management
boards  had  a  reasonable  quality  orientation.  Boards  were  familiar  with  quality  guidelines,
received  a  reasonable  amount  of  information  related  to  quality  and  used  this  for  monitor-
ing quality  and  policy-making.  However,  we  found  no  association  between  their  quality
orientation  and  hospital  performance.
Conclusion:  There  was  a growing  awareness  of  the  quality  of care  among  boards  of  trustees
and  management  boards;  yet  some  boards  still lagged  behind.  Quality  orientation  is  an
important asset  because  receiving,  reviewing  and  responding  to the quality  of  their  per-
formance  should  provide  opportunities  to  improve  quality.  However,  we  were  not  able  to
ﬁnd a  relationship  between  quality  orientation  and  hospital  performance.  Future  research
should investigate  how  boards  can develop  quality  management  systems  which  in  turn
could enable  medical  professionals  to optimise  their  delivery  of  care  and  thus  its  quality.
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1. Introduction
Hospitals are under increasing scrutiny to improve their
quality of care because of the changing health care system
and its increasing need for transparency [1]. This is a chal-
Open access under CC BY license.lenge for the hospitals governing bodies. In general, boards
of management are responsible for the daily running of
the hospital,while it is the responsibility of the board of
trustees to oversee and evaluate their activities and to hire
er CC BY license.
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and ﬁre the chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) [2]. Increasingly,
hospital managers are held responsible if doubts arise over
the quality and safety of care. There have been many exam-
ples of incidents in the media that emphasise the role
of hospital governance in the quality of care. In the UK
there is the case of the Staffordshire Hospital, where the
Foundation Trust’s management was criticised for the high
mortality rates. In the Netherlands, the management board
in the Scheper Hospital in Emmen  did not monitor the
quality of care properly, which allowed a dysfunctioning
hospital consultant to continue to endanger patient safety
[3]. Another example is the emergence of hospital bacte-
rial infection at the Maasstad Hospital in Rotterdam, which
was able to occur partially because both the hospital’s man-
agement board and its board of trustees lacked a sufﬁcient
focus on the quality of care [4]. Since these scandals still
seem to occur due to failing hospital governance, we  inves-
tigated how hospital governance in the Netherlands has
taken shape and to what extent hospital boards are orien-
tated towards quality.
Following the rationale of the agency theory, the board
of trustees, that is the principal, delegates responsibility to
perform certain tasks to the management board – the agent
– on their behalf [5]. A principal–agent problem arises
when both boards have incongruent objectives and insuf-
ﬁcient information is available to the board of trustees. In
order for these boards to ascertain the main objective of
the hospital, sufﬁcient information should be at hand and
actions should be taken accordingly. However, the rela-
tionship between a hospital’s board of trustees, and its
management board, is not well understood. Neither is their
inﬂuence on the quality of care.
The processes of governance towards quality of care
can best be understood by developing a new governance
model that is inspired by Deming’s well-established plan-
do-check-act cycle (Fig. 1). As such, in the planning stage
the board of trustees requests the management board to
deliver sufﬁcient information about the performance on
quality-related issues. This information can be summarised
and presented in a so-called quality “dashboard”, a man-
agement tool containing a variety of indicators. The content
of these dashboards necessitates medical professionals to
register, precisely and accurately, the care delivered and
to collate these data. The board of trustees in turn, makes
sure they actually receive this information. Information can
also be obtained by having direct contact with medical pro-
fessionals during walk rounds. Once the information about
quality performance is at hand, they then need to review
REQUEST
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Fig. 1. The governance model.113 (2013) 134– 141 135
and discuss the information in order to identify important
signals indicating the quality of performance. Which topics
are reviewed during board meetings will depend on how
the agenda is set, which reﬂects the priorities it sets in
decision-making [6]. Subsequently, the board can respond
by emphasising advice to the management board, by pre-
empting relevant management tasks, or ultimately by ﬁring
the CEO. By reviewing quality performance trustees can
improve quality because it provides an insight into what
is required.
Business studies have shown that emphasising quality
is a prerequisite to improving business performance [7].
This is because those businesses are more likely to develop
effective learning mechanisms [8]. In health care research
too, accumulating evidence shows the importance of pru-
dent hospital governance for the quality of care. Several
studies found associations between quality performance
and a range of initiatives. These included: establishing
a strategic goal for quality improvement; having quality
performance on the agenda of board meetings; monitor-
ing quality dashboards; and having a quality committee
[9–12]. Additionally, the engagement of CEOs in quality
was associated with the success of quality improvement
projects [13]. Jha and Epstein [14] found that in high-
performing hospitals, the board of trustees used quality
performance as a factor to evaluate the CEO’s perfor-
mance. They also found that those boards of trustees spent
more time on quality performance during meetings and
perceived quality to be an important aspect of governance.
However, most studies on hospital governance have been
carried out in the US, and little is known about the quality
orientation of boards in Dutch hospitals. It is important to
know to extent the two boards are oriented towards quality
of care, especially as they are responsible for this.
Our study aimed to determine ﬁrstly, how hospital gov-
ernance has taken shape in the Netherlands. Secondly, we
wished to identify the extent to which boards of trustees
and management boards are orientated towards quality.
And, thirdly, to determine how far this quality orientation
affected hospital performance.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Hospital governance in the Netherlands
We  used reports and policy guidelines published by
the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ) and the Council
for Public Health and Health Care (RvZ), among others, to
ascertain how hospital governance has developed.
2.2. Quality orientation
2.2.1. Participants
All 97 Dutch hospitals participated in our cross-
sectional quantitative study. All hospitals are private,
non-proﬁt organisations, eight of which are university hos-
pitals. For each hospital, the chair of the trustees and the
CEO, who  is the chair of the management board, were
invited to participate.
1  Policy 
2
a
2
o
c
p
d
D
h
w
b
“
n
i
w
t
o
“
t
b
f
a
t
2
c
p
o
l
a
i
o
q
m
p
t
t
i
i
s
o
s
r
a
w
t
I
h
y
w
r
d
m
i36 D. Botje et al. / Health
.2.2. Data collection
Data were collected on the degree of quality orientation
nd hospital performance on quality indicators.
.2.3. Survey development to measure quality
rientation
The respondents were asked in questionnaires to indi-
ate their board’s orientation towards quality of care. One
art of the questionnaire was based on a survey that was
eveloped by Jha and Epstein [14], and translated into
utch. Minor adjustments were made to ﬁt the Dutch
ealth care setting. The other part was used to indicate
hich type of information was received and used by the
oards.
Following the governance model (see Fig. 1), the
request” element was determined by the familiarity with
ational quality governance programmes and how the
mportance of quality was perceived. The “receive” element
as reﬂected by the type of information that was  provided
o the boards. The frequency in which quality appeared
n the boards’ agenda reﬂects the “review” element. The
respond” element for the trustees relates to the topics
hat were discussed during meetings with the management
oard and also to the use of quality performance as a factor
or the evaluation of the CEO by the trustees. For the man-
gement board, “respond” means using information related
o quality for policy-making.
.3. Hospital performance on process indicators
Indicators to measure quality performance can be
ategorised according to Donabedian’s structure–
rocess–outcome paradigm [15]. We  chose to focus
n process indicators because hospital leadership is more
ikely to inﬂuence processes rather than outcomes, which
re more the domain of medical professionals [16]. These
ndicators too are used extensively by insurers, patient
rganisations and the media to determine a hospital’s
uality performance. We  accept that process indicators,
easuring solely quantitatively, do not capture the com-
lete quality of care delivered [17]. However, we used
his as a proxy for hospital performance as it was  beyond
he scope of this study to complement it with qualitative
nterviews.
Hospital performance data comprised seven process
ndicators. These included: pain measurements after
urgery; stroke patients treated with thrombolysis within
ne hour after admission; hip fracture patients having
urgery within 24 h after admission; pneumonia patients
eceiving antibiotic therapy within 4 h after admission;
nd gastrointestinal and liver patients having endoscopy
ithin 24 h after admission. Hospitals are obliged to report
hese data to the central database of the Dutch Health Care
nspectorate [18], which become available on the website
ttp://www.ziekenhuizentransparant.nl in the following
ear. For each process indicator, the level of compliance
ith recommended care was expressed in percentages,anging from 0% (below par) to 100% (recommended care
elivered to all patients). For each hospital the composite
easure for performance was determined by calculat-
ng the average of the seven process indicators. We  used113 (2013) 134– 141
multiple imputation to correct for missing values. We  com-
pared the performance of the hospitals in our sample with
the performance of all Dutch hospitals. The performance of
our sample did not differ from all hospitals.
2.3.1. Procedure
Between November 2010 and February 2011, web-
based questionnaires were sent to the chairs of trustees and
the CEOs of 97 hospitals. Respondents received reminders
after two and four weeks. During the research project, four
hospitals merged into two  hospitals. Out of 95 hospitals
we received questionnaires from 54 different hospitals: 38
chairs of the trustees (RR = 40%) and 40 CEOs (RR = 42%).
From the 54 hospitals in our sample, we received question-
naires from both respondents from 22 hospitals. Hospital
performance data in 2010 were collected from the website
of the Health Care Inspectorate in July 2011 [18].
2.3.2. Data analysis
To answer the second research question, the answers
to the questionnaires were analysed using descriptive
statistics. Associative analyses were done to ﬁnd any
relationships between single items. To answer the third
research question, responses to the questionnaires were
compared between the top 25% and bottom 25% hos-
pitals for each respondent group using Student’s t-tests
for continuous items and Chi-squared distributions for
dichotomous items in the questionnaire. To determine sta-
tistical differences, the level of signiﬁcance was  set at 5%.
Statistical analyses were performed in Stata/SE 11.0 for
Windows.
3. Results
3.1. Hospital governance in the Netherlands
In the decentralised health care system, the governmen-
tal inference gradually decreased since the 80s, requiring
internal oversight bodies, the boards of trustees, to increas-
ingly challenge and support hospital management boards.
Dutch hospitals are private, non-proﬁt organisations and
their governance structure reﬂects a “two-tier model” that
is similar to a corporate model. This means that the role of
the trustees is more at arm’s length and independent, and
that they primarily oversee and evaluate the management
board.
Hospital performance therefore became the responsi-
bility of the trustees too, which required them to have good
insight in performance. With the introduction of the Inte-
gration Act (Stb, 1999, 271) in 2000, the ﬁnal responsibility
for the quality of care was assigned to the management
board. In order to provide some means of addressing the
division of responsibilities for the quality of care, national
guidelines were introduced to clarify the roles respectively
of the trustees and the management board. These guide-
line follow the same principle as European guidelines in
general, namely to comply or explain. In 2009, the Coun-
cil for Public Health and Health Care (RvZ) and the Health
Care Inspectorate (IGZ) stated that the management board
has ﬁnal responsibility for the quality and safety of care
[19,20]. The joint Health Care Sector Organisations (BoZ)
 Policy 113 (2013) 134– 141 137
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Fig. 2. Hospital performance on a composite measure of quality-relatedD. Botje et al. / Health
have established rules for good management and supervi-
sion in the 2010 Care-wide Governance Code [21]. They
describe which tasks, and methods of working, of the
trustees and the management board, contribute to good
management and responsible care. A role is laid down here
for trustees and the management board to share informa-
tion related to the quality of care [22].
While hospital governance is important, it does not
occur in a vacuum. All hospitals are part of a wider health
care system. The Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa) over-
sees the insurance and provider markets, while the IGZ
sets and monitors minimal quality standards. The role
of the IGZ and the emphasis on trustees’ responsibility
and accountability towards quality increases. In 2006, the
Health Insurance Act reformed the health care system into
a regulated market competition. This reform required care
providers and health insurers to negotiate over quality. It
was geared towards selective contracting with powerful
incentives for hospitals to improve their performance [23].
The effect of market competition on hospital performance,
however, depends largely on the level of transparency and
the ability of patients to select their preferred care provider
and/or health insurer [24]. Dutch citizens are obliged to
have health insurance but they are free to choose their
preferred insurer and provider [25]. However, 3–4% of the
consumers switched between insurers per year since 2007
[26]. This means that there does not seem to be a business
case for quality among health insurers; negotiations seem
to revolve around costs [27].
3.2. Quality orientation of trustees and management
boards
The hospitals participating were considered to be rep-
resentative to all Dutch hospitals regarding characteristics
such as location – either urban or rural, the number of beds
and personnel, or their annual income.
Table 1 summarises the quality orientation of 38 boards
of trustees. Thirty-ﬁve of the 38 chairs of the trustees
(92%) indicated they were at least moderately familiar with
programmes and reports on governance. In line with the
rationale of the governance model, information on many
quality-related topics were received by the majority of the
boards of trustees, for example concerning the improve-
ment projects (N = 35; 92%) or about incidents and disasters
(N = 32; 84%). Ten boards of trustees (26%) had quality
on the agenda at every meeting, while two boards (5%)
only discussed quality during a few meetings. According
to seven boards of trustees (18%), dashboards and balance
scorecards were discussed during every meeting with the
management board, while seven other boards of trustees
indicated that they never use them during those meetings.
Further analyses showed that boards which had quality
on the agenda at every meeting had higher self-reported
expertise in quality management (p < .01). The trustees
also had better alignment with the management board
about accountability and responsibility for the quality of
care (p = .03) than those who discussed quality less often
(p = .01).
Table 2 summarises the quality orientation of 40 man-
agement boards. According to 13 CEOs (33%), quality ofprocess indicators in 2010, divided by the top 10 and bottom 10 per-
forming hospitals for both respondent groups: board of trustees (BoT)
and  hospital management boards (HB).
care was the most important topic of their management
board. Many management boards received various types
of quality-related information such as results of quality
inspections (90%), the nature and extent of incidents or
disasters (78%) and mortality rates (53%), among others.
Quality was  discussed during every meeting by 10 man-
agement boards (25%). For policy-making, 36 management
boards used the results from quality inspections (90%), 35
boards used the nature and extent of incidents or disas-
ters (88%), while 20 boards used the nature and extent of
complications (60%).
3.3. Quality orientation and hospital performance
The performance of the hospitals in our sample did not
differ signiﬁcantly from all Dutch hospitals. They were con-
sidered to be representative of the performance of all Dutch
hospitals. For both respondent groups there were ten hos-
pitals in the top 25% and bottom 25%, hence the top ten and
bottom ten hospitals. As can be seen in Fig. 2, performance
on process indicators differed signiﬁcantly between the top
ten and bottom ten hospitals in both groups. The character-
istics of these hospitals did not differ signiﬁcantly from the
rest of the hospitals in our sample. However, there seems
to be no signiﬁcant differences between the top ten and
bottom ten hospitals on how boards of trustees rated their
inﬂuence on quality performance, their level of expertise
in quality management and how far they are aligned with
the management board on quality issues.
We  found no signiﬁcant association between hospital
performance and the degree to which the management
board was orientated towards quality. Nor did we ﬁnd dif-
ferences in how they perceived their inﬂuence on quality
performance and their level of expertise in quality manage-
ment. Further exploration of the 22 hospitals, from which
both respondents returned a questionnaire, showed no
association between the quality orientation of the boards
of trustees and the management boards (2 = 0.53, p = .47).
Neither was  there an association with hospital perfor-
mance.
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Table 1
Quality orientation of 38 boards of trustees in the Netherlands.
N (%)
Request
Importance of the quality of care
1st most important 13 (34)
2nd most important 12 (32)
3rd  most important 8 (21)
Not important 5 (13)
Familiarity with national quality programmes
Extensive 17 (45)
Moderate 18 (47)
Limited 3 (8)
Receive
Type of information received
Number and results from improvement paths/projects 35 (92)
Nature and extent of incidents/disasters 32 (84)
Results of quality inspections 32 (84)
Number and type of treatment 28 (74)
Mortality rates 26 (68)
Results of patient satisfaction surveys 26 (68)
Nature and extent of complications 24 (63)
Quality of the treatments carried out 20 (53)
Review
The  frequency quality appears on the agenda of board meetings
Every meeting 10 (26)
Most meetings 20 (53)
Some meetings 6 (16)
Few meetings 2 (5)
Never on the agenda 0 (0)
Respond
Importance of quality performance during CEO evaluation
1st most important 9 (24)
2nd most important 12 (32)
3rd  most important 9 (24)
Not important 8 (21)
Never Few meetings Some meetings Most meetings Every meeting
Respond
Topics discussed during meetings with hospital management board
Quality of care indicators 1 (3) 4 (11) 14 (37) 15 (39) 4 (11)
Progress of quality improvement projects 0 (0) 4 (11) 15 (39) 16 (42) 3 (8)
Dysfunctioning of medical specialists 1 (3) 5 (13) 19 (50) 11 (29) 2 (5)
Accreditation 2 (5) 5 (13) 19 (50) 11 (29) 1 (3)
9 (24)
16 (42)
16 (42)
4
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o
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bResults of patient satisfaction surveys 0 (0) 
Nature and extent of adverse events 5 (13) 
Bottlenecks with applying protocols and guidelines 7 (18) 
. Discussion
Our ﬁrst two objectives were to describe the governance
ystem in Dutch hospitals and to determine the quality
rientation of boards of trustees and management boards.
dditionally, we wanted to ﬁnd a relationship between the
uality orientation and hospital performance. There has
een a variety of policy guidelines that promoted good
overnance. We  also observed that the quality orienta-
ion of trustees and management boards is growing and
s widespread throughout many hospitals. However, we
ere not able to ﬁnd a relationship between the quality
rientation of trustees and management boards and their
ospital’s performance.The conceptualisation of hospital performance has its
imitations. Firstly, we used process indicators instead of
utcome indicators because we assumed that governing
odies primarily have inﬂuence on hospital processes, 23 (61) 5 (13) 1 (3)
 11 (29) 6 (16) 0 (0)
 15 (39) 1 (3) 0 (0)
while medical professionals have inﬂuence on patient out-
comes. Besides, previous studies emphasised that patient
level outcome measures, such as mortality rates, are prone
to imprecision and bias [28–30]. Secondly, although com-
plementing quantitative data with qualitative interviews
provides a more complete image of performance [17], it
was  beyond the scope of our study to complement our
quantitative data with qualitative interviews. Thirdly, a
Dutch study showed that performance indicators provide
limited insight into the quality of performance due to
ambiguity in the indicator deﬁnitions [31]. Despite these
limitations, these indicators still play, in daily practice, a
pivotal role in the transparency paradigm in providing an
external accountability. A last methodological limitation
was  the small sample size. Perhaps the lack of a business
case for quality explains the low response rate in our study.
Given the limitations of our study, the results on qual-
ity performance should be interpreted with caution. We
D. Botje et al. / Health Policy 
Table 2
Quality orientation of 40 hospital management boards in the Netherlands.
N (%)
Request
Importance of the quality of care
1st most important 13 (33)
2nd  most important 11 (28)
3rd  most important 12 (30)
Not  important 4 (10)
Familiarity with national quality programmes
Extensive 25 (63)
Moderate 13 (33)
Limited 2 (5)
Receive
Type of information received
Results of quality inspections 36 (90)
Nature and extent of incidents/disasters 31 (78)
Number and type of treatment 25 (63)
Nature and extent of complications 22 (55)
Mortality rates 21 (53)
Quality of the treatments carried out 20 (50)
Number and results from improvement paths/projects 17 (43)
Results of patient satisfaction surveys 8 (20)
Review
The frequency quality appears on the agenda of board meetings
Every meeting 10 (25)
Most meetings 23 (58)
Some meetings 7 (18)
Few meetings 0 (0)
Never on the agenda 0 (0)
Respond
Type of information used for policy-making
Results of quality inspections 36 (90)
Nature and extent of incidents/disasters 35 (88)
Number and type of treatment 35 (88)
Number and results from improvement paths/projects 34 (85)
Quality of the treatments carried out 30 (75)
Results of patient satisfaction surveys 26 (65)
Mortality rates 26 (65)
Nature and extent of complications 24 (60)
did, however, ﬁnd interesting results concerning the qual-
ity orientation of the governing bodies. Regarding the
governance model, the request element can be deter-
mined as the familiarity with, perceived expertise in,
and prioritisation of quality by boards of trustees. How-
ever, this seemed to be unrelated to a hospital’s actual
performance on quality-related process indicators. In a
US-study, high scores on these items occurred signiﬁ-
cantly more often among boards of trustees in the ten
per cent high-performing hospitals than in the ten per
cent low-performing hospitals [14]. Concerning the review
element, our data showed that many boards of trustees
were engaged with quality-oriented activities such as pla-
cing quality on the agenda, monitoring quality dashboards,
and discussing quality-related subjects with the manage-
ment board. However, this did not seem to differ between
the top ten and the bottom ten performing hospitals. Jha
and Epstein [14] found that, compared to the ten per cent
low-performing hospitals, signiﬁcantly more chairs in the
ten per cent high-performing hospitals placed quality on
the agenda at every meeting, spending at least 20% of
the meeting time on quality. On the level of CEOs simi-
lar results were found in other studies [9,12]. In order to
oversee a hospital, information about numerous aspects113 (2013) 134– 141 139
and processes is required. Weiner and colleagues showed
that boards who  were engaged in quality issues were also
likely to have increased involvement of physicians in qual-
ity improvement [32,33]. Concerning the respond element,
using quality performance as a topic for the evaluation of
the CEO, and the perceived inﬂuence on quality, were not
in our study found to be associated with hospital perfor-
mance. By contrast, both items were signiﬁcantly more
apparent in the ten per cent high-performing hospitals
than in the ten per cent low-performing ones [14]. Joshi
and Hines [11] showed that the orientation of the board
towards quality was  associated marginally with hospital
performance on outcome measures.
Many respondents indicated that their board is compa-
rable to other board within their hospital as far as taking
responsibility for quality. This is in line with one of Tay-
lor’s “Nine principles of good governance”, which states
that a good relationship between these governing bodies
is a prerequisite for good governance [2]. A good rela-
tionship between these boards might also depend on the
role and ofﬁcial tasks of the trustees [34–36]. Interest-
ingly, these tasks vary between countries. For example, in
Canada they are also responsible for developing the hos-
pital’s aims and mission statements [37]. In the UK, their
main tasks are to monitor performance of the manage-
ment board and to set strategic direction [38]. In France,
the equivalent of the board of trustees has no power other
than to provide suggestions to the management board
[39]. Previous research also showed that CEO participa-
tion in this board is associated with hospital performance
[40]. Additionally, having clinicians on boards was  found
to be associated with good hospital performance in the UK
[41].
In the Netherlands, the health care reform of 2006
was supposed to create a greater focus on the quality of
performance by means of market competition. Although
consumer preferences are just beginning to inﬂuence
insurers’ policy [42], previous studies found that the focus
of hospitals still seems to be on ﬁnancial issues rather than
on quality [24]. In other European countries, health care
systems are being reformed to meet their citizens’ health
care needs and to assure quality of health care [43]. For
example, the Health Transformation Programme in Turkey
in 2003 introduced a performance-based payment system
that led to increased service efﬁciency and patient satis-
faction [44]. In Norway, the Hospitals Enterprise Act led
to a governance structure that comprised of one board
having conﬂicting roles, namely, both that of an agent,
the management, and the principal role, the owners, who
were the Ministry of Health [46]. In order to prevent
a principal–agent problem, it is important the know to
what extent both boards are informed about, and oriented
towards quality of care. Our study showed that there still
can be a discrepancy between having a national policy
for quality governance on the one hand, and the qual-
ity orientation of trustees and management boards on the
other.Our results indicate that boards do not seem to affect
the quality of care. That is remarkable since boards are
held responsible for the quality performance of their hos-
pital. One explanation could be that it takes more time
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o see the effect of hospital governance on quality per-
ormance. Elements of quality governance were associated
ith quality performance in US hospitals, probably because
hey have a longer history of quality governance than in
he Netherlands. Another explanation could be that the
elationship between the quality orientation of boards
nd quality performance is non-linear. We  assume that
oards inﬂuence the hospital quality management sys-
ems that enable medical professionals to optimise their
are delivery, which in turn leads to better quality of care.
his mechanism, however, is not yet well understood.
arious studies have already found either a positive rela-
ionship between engaged leadership and the development
f quality management systems, or a positive relationship
etween quality management systems and hospital perfor-
ance [47,48]. Therefore, future research should focus on
etter understanding of how boards can improve quality
erformance. Research should investigate in a more qual-
tative manner the relationship between how boards are
rientated towards quality and the quality of their hos-
itals’ performance. Another focus could be to investigate
ow boards inﬂuence more structural elements of quality
anagement and the involvement of medical professionals
n governance.
. Conclusions
We  found that trustees and hospital management
oards are reasonably orientated towards quality. Receiv-
ng and reviewing information about quality performance
hould provide insights and opportunities to improve qual-
ty. However, we were not able to ﬁnd a linear relationship
etween quality orientation and hospital performance.
herefore, we assume that boards have a non-linear inﬂu-
nce on quality performance, meaning that they might
nstigate the development of quality management systems,
hich in turn could enable medical professionals to opti-
ise their care delivery, leading to better quality of care.
uture research should focus on the underlying mecha-
isms of improving the quality of care. After all, hospital
oards are responsible for the quality of care, so it is essen-
ial for them to know how they can achieve it.
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